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2016 P Cr. L J 1463
[Lahore]
Before Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and Sikandar Zulqarnain Saleem, JJ
NAWAZISH ALI and 3 others—Petitioners
Versus
The STATE and another—Respondents
Criminal Revision No.211 of 2014, decided on 12th January, 2015.
Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)—
—-Ss. 6, 7 & 23—Application for transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction was dismissed—Validity—For determining the issue, whether the offence was triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or not, nature of offence had to be seen in the light of the averments as to how the same had been committed along with the particular place of incident; and further that by that act a sense of fear and insecurity in the society had been created in the minds of the people at large or not—Petitioners/accused persons, in the present case, armed with deadly weapon made criminal assault on the Police picket, causing murder of Sub-Inspector of Police and injuring passerby, thereby committed offence of “terrorism” triable by Anti-Terrorism Court—Place of incident was a Police picket, which was normally to be established so as to ensure safety and security to the people of the area—“Action” i.e. manner of the offence, involved in the matter, was an attack upon established Police picket—Such action would lead to an alarming situation and impression upon the people that if Police Officials, and Police posts were not safe, then what impact would be upon general public—Such would show the worst situation of lawlessness—Under such circumstances, not only vicinity of that area, but public at large, would have serious effect of insecurity, lawlessness and uncertainty in their routine life—Present case was not one of private vendatta, but action of accused persons reflected that it was a deliberate and intentional act—Prima facie, there was sufficient material on the file to suggest that accused had resorted to indiscriminate firing at the Police party—Act of petitioners fell within the purview of Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Interference with or disruption of the duty of the public servants involved or coercion or intimidation of or violence against public servant, was “serious” enough to attract the definition of “terrorism”—Contention that alleged weapon used during the incident was .30 bore pistol, which was not an automatic weapon, whereas the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, attracted only when the weapon used was Kalashnikov, or other allied automatic, weapon, was misconceived, as S.2(g) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 clearly denoted that “firearm” would mean any or all type and gauges of handguns, rifles and shotgun, whether automatic, semi-automatic or bolt action; and would include all other firearms as defined in Arms Ordinance, 1965—Well reasoned order, in absence of any error could not be interfered with— Revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Mati-u-Rehman v. Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad 2008 MLD 840 ref.
Sh. Muhammad Suleman for Petitioners.
Muhammad Ikram Ullah Khan, Deputy Prosecutor-General with Hasnat, S.I. for the State.
Zafar Mehmood, brother of deceased in person.
ORDER
Through this revision petition under section 435 read with section 439, Cr.P.C., the petitioners have challenged the validity of order dated 02.12.2014 passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No. I, Rawalpindi whereby an application moved by the petitioners under section 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of the case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction has been dismissed.
[Terrorism.-(I) In this Act, “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls with the meaning of subsection (2), and
(b) the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or sect [or a foreign government or population or and international organization] or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or
(c) the use of threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, [or intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, media persons, business community or attacking the civilian, including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means, government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies].
[Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to a democratic and religious rally or a peaceful demonstration in accordance with law.]
(2) An “action” shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), it:
(a) involves the doing of anything that causes death;
(b) involves grievous violence against a person or grievous bodily injury or harm to a person;
(c) involves grievous damage to property, [including government premises, official installations, schools, hospitals, offices or any other public or private property including damaging property by ransacking, looting or arson or by any other means.];
(d) involves the doing of anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a person’s life;
(e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking;
[(ee) ……………………………
(f) ……………………………..
[(g) involves taking the law in own hand, award of any punishment by an organization, individual or group whatsoever, not recognized by the law, with a view to coerce, intimidate or terrorize public, individuals, groups, communities, government officials and institutions, including law enforcement agencies beyond the purview of the law of the land;]
(h) ……………………………..
(i) ……………………………..
(j) ……………………………..
(k) ……………………………..
(l) ……………………………..
(m) involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties,
(n) involves serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces, civil armed forces, or a public servant.
[(o) ……………………………..
(p) ……………………………..
(3) The use or threat or use of any action falling within subsection (2), which involves the use of fire-arms, explosives or any other weapon, is terrorism, whether or not subsection (1)(c) is satisfied.
[(3-A) …………………………
(4) ……………………………..
(5) ……………………………..
(6) ……………………………..
(7) ……………………………..
(a) ……………………………..
(b) ……………………………..
“We have straight away observed that according to the allegations leveled in the FIR the petitioner and his co-accused had launched an assault upon members of the police force and some revenue officials so as to deter them from performing their officials duties and had caused injuries to as many as seven police officers, if such allegations are accepted as correct at their face value then the actus reus attributed to the petitioner and his co-accused prima facie attracted the provisions of section 6(2)(m)(n) of Act, 1997.”
In the case in hand, prima facie, there is sufficient material on the file to suggest that the accused had resorted to indiscriminate firing at the police party as a result of which Mehmood Ahmad, S.I. was done to death and one passerby had also received injuries. Factum of firing by petitioners at the police party had been brought on the file and as such act of petitioners falls within the purview of sections 6 and 7 of Anti¬-Terrorism Act, 1997. Section 6(2)(m) of Anti-Terrorism Act, involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties. The word ‘serious’ has been defined by section 2(w) of the said Act to mean “dangerous to life or property”. From the facts of the case it is clear that interference with or disruption of the duty of the public servants involved or coercion or intimidation of or violence against such public servants was “serious” enough to attract the definition of ‘terrorism’ contained in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act as Mehmood Ahmad, S.I. who was on official duty was done to death and one passerby namely Waheed Abbas had also received injuries during the incident of attack by the petitioners at the police party. Even otherwise, we have straight away observed that according to the allegations leveled in the FIR the petitioner and his co-accused had launched an assault upon members of the police force so as to deter them from performing their official duties, if such allegations are accepted as correct at their face value then the actus reus attributed to the petitioners prima facie attracted the provisions of section 6(2)(m)(n) of Act, 1997.
HBT/N-6/L Petition dismissed.